First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0666-yzbMath1282.91142MaRDI QIDQ1941977

Gábor Virág

Publication date: 25 March 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17094/1/MPRA_paper_17094.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctions; resale; incomplete information; dynamic market interaction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed, Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues, Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity, Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining, Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects, Auctions with resale and risk aversion

Cites Work

• Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
• First price auctions with resale
• Manipulative auction design
• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale