First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1941977
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0666-yzbMath1282.91142MaRDI QIDQ1941977
Publication date: 25 March 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17094/1/MPRA_paper_17094.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed, Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues, Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity, Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining, Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects, Auctions with resale and risk aversion
Cites Work
- Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
- Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
- First price auctions with resale
- Manipulative auction design
- Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
- Optimal Auction Design
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale