The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
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Publication:1616494
DOI10.1007/s00712-017-0590-0zbMath1417.91242OpenAlexW2275076240MaRDI QIDQ1616494
Frank Stähler, Onur A. Koska, Ilke Onur
Publication date: 6 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/56653
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