Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
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Publication:4845250
DOI10.2307/2171909zbMath0837.90033OpenAlexW1591765456MaRDI QIDQ4845250
Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent
Publication date: 4 September 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/999.pdf
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