Equilibrium and welfare analysis in second-price auctions with resale and costly entry

DOI10.1155/2022/9220681zbMath1505.91180OpenAlexW4307887043MaRDI QIDQ2682520

Yunxia Yang, Siru Li, Yuntao Yang, Xiaoyong Cao

Publication date: 1 February 2023

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/9220681

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues
• Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
• Auctions with synergy and resale
• Auctions with resale and bargaining power
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
• Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• First price auctions with resale
• Auctions with speculators: an experimental study
• Can resale harm the original seller in a second-price auction?
• Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs
• Auctions with entry and resale
• The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions

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