Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
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Publication:405548
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.07.013zbMATH Open1296.91139OpenAlexW1994759319MaRDI QIDQ405548FDOQ405548
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013
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Cites Work
- Optimal Auction Design
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
- Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
Cited In (13)
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
- Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Equilibrium and welfare analysis in second-price auctions with resale and costly entry
- Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- Externalities in a bargaining model of public price announcements and resale
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