Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
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Cites work
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
- Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
Cited in
(13)- Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
- Optimal Auction with Resale
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- Equilibrium and welfare analysis in second-price auctions with resale and costly entry
- On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
- Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Externalities in a bargaining model of public price announcements and resale
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