Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.02.006MaRDI QIDQ1783447zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Diego Moreno, John Wooders

Publication date 21 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25137

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous entrypublic and secret reserve pricesrisk aversionsecond-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
• How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
• Reserve prices without commitment
• Auctions with resale and risk aversion
• Auction design with a risk averse seller

Cites work

• Auctions with entry
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Reserve prices in repeated auctions
• How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
• Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
• Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• Auctions with resale and risk aversion
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
• On the existence of equilibria with entry and trade in second-price auctions with a secret reserve price
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions

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