Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
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Publication:972879
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3297399 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
- Auctions with entry
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
Cited in
(42)- Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
- Properties of bid and ask reservation prices in the rank-dependent expected utility model
- Estimation and inference of seller's expected revenue in first-price auctions
- Auction design with a risk averse seller
- Optimal auctions: non-expected utility and constant risk aversion
- How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
- On-demand or spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values
- Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers
- A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions
- Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
- Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Competing auctions with non-identical objects
- Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments
- Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices?
- A note on pricing with risk aversion
- Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
- First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
- Competing first-price and second-price auctions
- Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
- Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
- Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions
- Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences
- Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
- Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse
- Premium auctions and risk preferences: an experimental study
- Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility
- Auctions with resale and risk aversion
- Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry
- Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Auctions with anticipated emotions: overbidding, underbidding, and optimal reserve prices
- Nonparametric estimation of utility function in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty
- Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion
- Premium auctions and risk preferences
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