Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
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Recommendations
- Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
- Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion
- All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
- All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints
- On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions
- Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values
- Premium auctions and risk preferences: an experimental study
Cites work
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times
- Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
- Manipulations in contests
- Microeconomic theory
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
- Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
- Sad-loser contests
Cited in
(9)- Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
- On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Contests with insurance
- Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest
- Manipulation of moves in sequential contests
- Nonlinear optimization of revenue per unit of time in discrete Dutch auctions with risk-aware bidders
- All-pay auctions with different forfeits
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
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