All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
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Publication:857568
DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0034-5zbMATH Open1154.91411OpenAlexW2117339108MaRDI QIDQ857568FDOQ857568
Authors: Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela 
Publication date: 19 December 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0034-5
Recommendations
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
- On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
- Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
- The all-pay auction with complete information
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal Auction Design
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
- Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
- \(k\)-price auctions
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
Cited In (23)
- All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
- Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Optimal Stackelberg strategies for financing a supply chain through online peer-to-peer lending
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents
- Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions
- Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
- Revenue implications of strategic and external auction risk
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
- The spite motive in third price auctions
- Revenue in contests with many participants
- The gender difference in the value of winning
- Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
- Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
- The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
- On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
- Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
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