All-pay auctions with risk-averse players

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0034-5MaRDI QIDQ857568zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela

Publication date 19 December 2006

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0034-5

zbMATH Keywords

Risk aversionPerturbation analysisPrivate-value auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
• Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
• On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
• Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3649136 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3939034 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• \(k\)-price auctions

Cited in

(23)

• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
• Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
• Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests
• Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
• Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
• Revenue implications of strategic and external auction risk
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Optimal Stackelberg strategies for financing a supply chain through online peer-to-peer lending
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions
• Price of Anarchy for Mechanisms with Risk-Averse Agents
• All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
• On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• The spite motive in third price auctions
• Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
• Revenue in contests with many participants
• The gender difference in the value of winning
• The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups

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