In the paper the problem of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies in \(k\)-price auctions (\(3\leq k\)) is considered, under the assumptions of independent private values and various attitudes of agents toward risk. The authors prove that there is at most one continuous symmetric equilibrium in these games and provide its characterization. Earlier results obtained by \textit{J. H. Kagel} and \textit{D. Levin} [Econ. J. 103, 868-879 (1993)] are generalized, i.e., it is proved for \(k=3\) and distribution functions satisfying some technical conditions that (1) agents with any attitude toward risk overbid in equilibrium and (2) if the agents are risk averse, then the bids are decreasing with the number of participants.
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- Distributed games
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3638844 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
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- A note on k-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed
- \(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design
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- A note on k-price auctions with complete information
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- Reserve price (in)equivalence: shill bidding to lower the reserve price
- Excess wealth order and sample spacings
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- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k+1)-st price common value auctions
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