\(k\)-price auctions (Q1577958)

In the paper the problem of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies in \(k\)-price auctions (\(3\leq k\)) is considered, under the assumptions of independent private values and various attitudes of agents toward risk. The authors prove that there is at most one continuous symmetric equilibrium in these games and provide its characterization. Earlier results obtained by \textit{J. H. Kagel} and \textit{D. Levin} [Econ. J. 103, 868-879 (1993)] are generalized, i.e., it is proved for \(k=3\) and distribution functions satisfying some technical conditions that (1) agents with any attitude toward risk overbid in equilibrium and (2) if the agents are risk averse, then the bids are decreasing with the number of participants.