Self serving reference points in double auctions

DOI10.1111/BOER.12214MaRDI QIDQ5117644zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Husnain Fateh Ahmad

Publication date 26 August 2020

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12214

zbMATH Keywords

consistent reference pointdouble auctionsreference dependenceself serving bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(1)

• Reference point dependence and specification bias

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