Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
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(26)- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Modularity and greed in double auctions
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
- Agent competition double-auction mechanism
- Double Auction in Two-Level Markets
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Robust mechanism design of exchange
- Dynamic double auctions: toward first best
- Self serving reference points in double auctions
- A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation-based tâtonnement
- Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
- Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
- Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders
- The matching benefits of market thickness
- An ascending double auction
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
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