Dynamic double auctions: towards first best

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.11MaRDI QIDQ5236192zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Santiago R. Balseiro, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo, Vahab S. Mirrokni

Publication date 15 October 2019

Published in Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.11

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic double auctionsmechanism designtwo-sided markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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