(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Publication:2667262
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.08.011zbMATH Open1478.91087arXiv1604.04876OpenAlexW3197632327MaRDI QIDQ2667262FDOQ2667262
Authors: Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski 
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We design simple and robust mechanisms that obtain approximate efficiency with these properties. We show that even minimal use of statistical data can yield good approximation results. Finally, we demonstrate how a mechanism for this simple bilateral-trade problem can be used as a "black-box" for constructing mechanisms in more general environments.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.04876
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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