On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108545MaRDI QIDQ2292744zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ziyang Shen, Zhenhua Jiao

Publication date 5 February 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108545

zbMATH Keywords

top trading cycles mechanismaffirmative actionresponsivenessvirtual homogeneity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
• Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
• Competitive equilibria in school assignment
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• On cores and indivisibility
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles

Cited in

(4)

• Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
• Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
• School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution

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