On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
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Publication:2292744
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108545zbMATH Open1429.91235OpenAlexW2962647666MaRDI QIDQ2292744FDOQ2292744
Authors: Ziyang Shen, Zhenhua Jiao 
Publication date: 5 February 2020
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108545
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Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
Cited In (4)
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
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