THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4629238
DOI10.1111/iere.12335zbMath1419.91527OpenAlexW2278984909WikidataQ129639371 ScholiaQ129639371MaRDI QIDQ4629238
Onur Kesten, Rustamdjan Hakimov
Publication date: 21 March 2019
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/104065/1/805016554.pdf
Related Items (7)
On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics ⋮ Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
This page was built for publication: THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
