Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
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Publication:6121908
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.102967OpenAlexW4392361174MaRDI QIDQ6121908FDOQ6121908
Jiangtao Li, Gaoji Hu, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan
Publication date: 26 March 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102967
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