Recommendations
Cites work
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- Cores and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities and lotteries
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Endowments, exclusion, and exchange
- Equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple indivisible commodities and money
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak core
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life assignment mechanism
- On cores and indivisibility
- On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Restricted housewapping games
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- School choice: an experimental study
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Understanding preferences: ``demand types, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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