A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.12.006MaRDI QIDQ2444698zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabriel Carroll

Publication date 10 April 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

equivalencerandom serial dictatorshiprandom assignmentindivisible goodstop trading cyclesserial dictatorship in groups

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

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• Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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• Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
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• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
• Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Strategyproof single unit award rules
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(16)

• What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
• Top trading cycles
• Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
• Trading probabilities along cycles
• Efficient matching under general constraints
• Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
• Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
• An impossibility theorem for allocation aggregation
• Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
• Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf

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