A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.12.006zbMATH Open1296.91173OpenAlexW2027375228MaRDI QIDQ2444698FDOQ2444698
Authors: Gabriel Carroll 
Publication date: 10 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.006
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equivalencerandom serial dictatorshiprandom assignmentindivisible goodstop trading cyclesserial dictatorship in groups
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
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- Strategyproof single unit award rules
- An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
- Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
Cited In (16)
- What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
- Top trading cycles
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- Efficient matching under general constraints
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
- An impossibility theorem for allocation aggregation
- Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
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