Strategyproof single unit award rules

DOI10.1007/S003550000084MaRDI QIDQ2388828zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Szilvia Pápai

Publication date 20 September 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000084

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems

Cited in

(12)

• Centralized allocation in multiple markets
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Randomized strategyproof mechanisms with best of both worlds fairness and efficiency
• Non-bossiness
• Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
• Influence in private-goods allocation
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof partitioning
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

This page was built for publication: Strategyproof single unit award rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2388828)