Strategy-proof allotment rules
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Recommendations
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
Cites work
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
Cited in
(54)- Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
- Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
- Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Strategy-proof risk sharing
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints
- Strategyproof single unit award rules
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- Menu mechanisms
- On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems
- Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation
- Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- The division problem with voluntary participation
- A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems
- Allocation rules for games with optimistic aspirations
- Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions
- Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences
- Stable sharing
- Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
- Non-bossiness
- Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
- Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
- Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
- Symmetry and impartial lotteries
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
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