Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
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Cites work
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
- Agent-wise-replication invariance, the Walrasian solution and the uniform rule
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- Better ways to cut a cake
- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
- Obvious manipulability of voting rules
- Obvious manipulations
- Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
- Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
- Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims
- Proportional pie-cutting
- Rationing in the presence of baselines
- Rationing with baselines: the composition extension operator
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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