Asylum assignment and burden-sharing

DOI10.1007/S00199-025-01696-8MaRDI QIDQ7321601zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna

Publication date 28 August 2026

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-025-01696-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• A college admissions clearinghouse
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options
• Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: a single-peaked preferences investigation
• Dynamic placement in refugee resettlement
• Dynamic reserves in matching markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
• Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions)
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
• Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
• Obvious manipulations
• Placement optimization in refugee resettlement
• Stability vs. no justified envy
• Stability, strategy-proofness, and cumulative offer mechanisms
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?

This page was built for publication: Asylum assignment and burden-sharing

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7321601)