Obvious manipulability of voting rules
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Cites work
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Barriers to manipulation in voting
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Obvious manipulations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(9)- Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
- (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms
- Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money
- Not obviously manipulable allotment rules
- Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
- Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts
- A note on obvious manipulations of quantile stable mechanisms
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