Where are the hard manipulation problems?
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
Cited in
(20)- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
- Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
- A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting
- Obvious manipulability of voting rules
- Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
- The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
- Algorithms and Computation
- Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
- Drawing a map of elections
- On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
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