Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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- Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
- On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
- On the difficulty of making social choices
- Ensemble feature selection using election methods and ranker clustering
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
- The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
- Distance restricted manipulation in voting
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
- Strategic voting in negotiating teams
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
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- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5527898 (Why is no real title available?)
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- Analysing vote counting algorithms via logic. And its application to the CADE election scheme
- Toward Computing the Margin of Victory in Single Transferable Vote Elections
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
- Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
- Collective decision making
- On the complexity of destructive bribery in approval-based multiwinner voting
- Rank aggregation using scoring rules
- Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
- Vote trading in public elections
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
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