Complexity of safe strategic voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_19MaRDI QIDQ3162520zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind

Publication date 19 October 2010

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_19

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cites work

• Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
• Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 610968 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(6)

• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Protecting elections by recounting ballots
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Choosing the best among peers
• How hard is safe bribery?
• On the safety of group manipulation

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