Rank aggregation using scoring rules
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485441 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005933 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1305522 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3221981 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Update monotone preference rules
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Which problems have strongly exponential complexity?
- \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
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