Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.04.025MaRDI QIDQ319803zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rudolf Berghammer, Henning Schnoor

Publication date 6 October 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.025

zbMATH Keywords

artificial intelligenceuncovered setrelation algebraCondorcet votingcontrol problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3929034 (Why is no real title available?)
• Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
• Automated verification of relational while-programs
• Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
• Computer Algebra in Scientific Computing
• Computing and visualizing Banks sets of dominance relations using relation algebra and RelView
• Computing the minimal covering set
• Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView
• Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
• Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
• Extending Condorcet's rule
• How hard is it to control an election?
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(4)

• Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
• Relation Algebra and RelView Applied to Approval Voting
• Relation algebra, RelView, and plurality voting
• On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• RelView

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