Computing the minimal covering set

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001zbMath1142.91725MaRDI QIDQ943589

Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer

Publication date: 10 September 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexity; social choice theory; uncovered set; minimal covering set; essential set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C05: Linear programming

91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution

91-04: Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

Related Items

The computational complexity of weak saddles, A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set, A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions, The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior, The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets

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