Computing the minimal covering set
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Publication:943589
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.04.001zbMATH Open1142.91725OpenAlexW2098386424MaRDI QIDQ943589FDOQ943589
Publication date: 10 September 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.04.001
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Cited In (21)
- Uncovered sets
- Efficiently computing minimal sets of critical pairs
- A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
- Complexity results for preference aggregation over \((m)\)CP-nets: max and rank voting
- Algorithms and Computation
- A new algorithm to find the smallest committee containing a given set of players
- Constructing Minimal Coverability Sets
- A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
- The complexity of minimum difference cover
- A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality
- Minimal covering set solutions
- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
- The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior
- Revealed Preference Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: Formulations and Algorithms
- The computational complexity of weak saddles
- Voting Procedures, Complexity of
- A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
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