On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_26zbMath1136.91308MaRDI QIDQ5459994

Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer

Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_26

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)

Related Items

On the rate of convergence of fictitious play, Computing the minimal covering set, On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Regular equilibrium points of bimatrix games
• Bimatrix games have quasi-strict equilibria
• Impossibility theorems for normal form games
• Another impossibility result for normal form games
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form
• Equilibrium selection and consistency
• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• Simple complexity from imitation games
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Non-cooperative games
• Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games
• Symmetries and the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibrium
• Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
• On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples
• Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• A symmetrization for finite two-person games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept