Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
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Publication:3960495
DOI10.1287/moor.6.4.530zbMath0496.90087MaRDI QIDQ3960495
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.4.530
stability; regularity; completely mixed bimatrix games; maximal Nash subset; regular equilibrium points
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