Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games

DOI10.1287/moor.6.4.530zbMath0496.90087OpenAlexW2076830607MaRDI QIDQ3960495

M. J. M. Jansen

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.4.530

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityregularitycompletely mixed bimatrix gamesmaximal Nash subsetregular equilibrium points

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (20)

Regular equilibrium points of bimatrix games ⋮ Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining ⋮ A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game ⋮ Perturbation theory of completely mixed bimatrix games ⋮ Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium ⋮ On proper refinement of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games ⋮ Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points in bimatrix games ⋮ Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players ⋮ Game dynamics and Nash equilibria ⋮ Zero-Sum Two Person Games ⋮ Is having a unique equilibrium robust? ⋮ On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria ⋮ Equilibrium points in special n-person games ⋮ A generalization of the Nash equilibrium theorem on bimatrix games ⋮ A note on polymatrix games ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection ⋮ Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games ⋮ Strictly perfect equilibrium points of bimatrix games ⋮ A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game. ⋮ A generalization of an oddness-theorem for bimatrix games

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