Game dynamics and Nash equilibria
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Publication:482553
DOI10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537zbMath1360.91029arXiv1211.5329MaRDI QIDQ482553
Publication date: 5 January 2015
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.5329
34A34: Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems
34A60: Ordinary differential inclusions
91A22: Evolutionary games
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Cites Work
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- Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
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