Game dynamics and Nash equilibria

DOI10.3934/JDG.2014.1.537zbMATH Open1360.91029arXiv1211.5329OpenAlexW2953128869MaRDI QIDQ482553FDOQ482553

Authors: Yannick Viossat 

Publication date: 5 January 2015

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.5329

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumreplicator dynamicsbest-reply dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems (34A34) Ordinary differential inclusions (34A60) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
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• Social Stability and Equilibrium
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• The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
• Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
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Cited In (24)

• ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
• Best response dynamics for role games
• NEWTONIAN MECHANICS AND NASH PLAY
• NASH EQUILIBRIUMS IN TWO-PERSON RED-AND-BLACK GAMES
• Hyperbolic consensus games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Two-population replicator dynamics and number of Nash equilibria in matrix games
• The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
• Bounds on price of anarchy on linear cost functions
• Hyperbolic dynamics in Nash maps
• On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
• The frequency of convergent games under best-response dynamics
• Strategic Ramsey equilibrium dynamics
• Continuous time learning algorithms in optimization and game theory
• Game-dynamical aspects of the prisoner's dilemma
• Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
• Analysis of equilibrium trajectories in dynamic bimatrix games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The price of anarchy as a classifier for mechanism design in a Pareto-Bayesian-Nash context
• The dynamics of the Nash map for 2 by 2 games
• Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
• Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games

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