scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3904454
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0547.00058.] The theory of incentives originated in the economic literature. The author, among others, formulated incentives from a system theoretic (dynamic games) point of view. The present paper, which deals with stochastic incentive decision problems, consists of two parts. In the first part, an abstract formulation for stochastic incentive problems is given. Equilibrium solutions used earlier for such incentive problems are interpreted in terms of the familiar Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium solution concepts. Four different incentive problems are treated as special cases of the general problem. These are revelation of truth, principal-agent problem, strategic information transmission and redundant dynamic information. the first three are active research areas in economics. The author brought them into one general framework. The second part of the paper deals with the redundant dynamic information problem in detail. In particular, a sensitivity analysis is given for this problem in case of unknown parameters. This is also illustrated by means of an example.
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