Game dynamics and Nash equilibria

DOI10.3934/JDG.2014.1.537MaRDI QIDQ482553zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yannick Viossat

Publication date 5 January 2015

Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.5329

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumreplicator dynamicsbest-reply dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems (34A34) Ordinary differential inclusions (34A60) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

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Cited in

(24)

• Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
• ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
• Best response dynamics for role games
• NEWTONIAN MECHANICS AND NASH PLAY
• NASH EQUILIBRIUMS IN TWO-PERSON RED-AND-BLACK GAMES
• Hyperbolic consensus games
• Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3904454 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4012365 (Why is no real title available?)
• Two-population replicator dynamics and number of Nash equilibria in matrix games
• The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
• Bounds on price of anarchy on linear cost functions
• Hyperbolic dynamics in Nash maps
• On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
• The frequency of convergent games under best-response dynamics
• Strategic Ramsey equilibrium dynamics
• Continuous time learning algorithms in optimization and game theory
• Game-dynamical aspects of the prisoner's dilemma
• Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
• Analysis of equilibrium trajectories in dynamic bimatrix games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 877670 (Why is no real title available?)
• The price of anarchy as a classifier for mechanism design in a Pareto-Bayesian-Nash context
• The dynamics of the Nash map for 2 by 2 games
• Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

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