Best response dynamics for role games

DOI10.1007/S001820200096MaRDI QIDQ1414424zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ulrich Berger

Publication date 23 November 2003

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200096

zbMATH Keywords

LearningEvolutionBest Response DynamicsRole Games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited in

(12)

• Best response equivalence
• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata
• Fictitious play in \(2\times n\) games
• Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels
• A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION
• Knowledge and best responses in games
• Non-algebraic convergence proofs for continuous-time fictitious play
• Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the matching pennies game
• Dynamics of signaling games
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis

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