Best response equivalence
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Two finite strategic games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence (for mixed strategies). A characterization of best-response equivalence is given, under generic conditions. In particular, it shows that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. A similar characterization is also given for better-response equivalence, and links with Von Neumann-Morgenstern equivalence are provided.
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Cites work
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- Fictitious play in one-against-all multi-player games
- Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
- Fundamentals of convex analysis
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
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- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Uniform embeddings of hyperbolic groups in Hilbert spaces
Cited in
(30)- The lottery contest is a best-response potential game
- Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
- Strategic decompositions of normal form games: zero-sum games and potential games
- Fictitious play in networks
- The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
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- The cutting power of preparation
- Dynamics in near-potential games
- Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Payoff performance of fictitious play
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities
- Rule rationality
- On the recoverability of forecasters' preferences
- Identification of payoffs in repeated games
- ORDINAL GAMES
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Cournot tatonnement and potentials
- Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games
- Two equivalence results for two-person strict games
- Strategic complementarities and nested potential games
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
- Potentials in social environments
- Bounds for best response functions in binary games
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games
- p-best response set
- Correlated equilibrium and concave games
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