Strategic complementarities and nested potential games
The author studies some special class of \(n\)-person non-cooperative games \(\Gamma\) of \textit{week strategic complementarities}, where the action set of one of the players is an \(m\)-dimensional Euclidean space \(\mathbb{R}^m\), the remaining players have their action sets one-dimensional \(\mathbb{R}^1\), and all the set actions are finite lattices. By definition, that property says that for each player there exists a non-decreasing selection in his best-responce correspondence. Next he introduces the definition of a \textit{nested pseudo-potential games}, coming (in part) from Dubey and Haimanko. It is shown in the main theorem of the paper that game \(\Gamma\) always is a nested pseudo-potential game. Also, in several examples, some relationships between strategic complementarities, a pseudo-potential and a nested pseudo-potential are discussed.
- Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games
- Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.
- Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities
- Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
- Finite composite games: equilibria and dynamics
- Complementarity modeling and game theory: a survey
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
- Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
- Best response equivalence
- Best-response potential games
- Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Potential games
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
- A characterization of strategic complementarities.
- The lottery contest is a best-response potential game
- Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes
- A survey of static and dynamic potential games
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
- Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria
- Potential Functions in Strategic Games
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
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