Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
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Publication:2434967
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0736-9zbMath1284.91092OpenAlexW2119390584MaRDI QIDQ2434967
Publication date: 3 February 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0736-9
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Cites Work
- Comparative statics for the consumer problem
- The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
- The dynamic evolution of preferences
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
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