The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1581190

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2587zbMath1112.91312OpenAlexW2110204154MaRDI QIDQ1581190

Levent Koçkesen, Rajiv Sethi, Efe A. Ok

Publication date: 14 January 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2468040e1af5f3df175aca6287a569915fd20d4d




Related Items (30)

The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignoranceWhat to maximize if you mustThe evolutionary role of toughness in bargainingThe dynamic evolution of preferencesStability, multi-stability and instability in Cournot duopoly game with knowledge spillover effects and relative profit maximizationBargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populationsCompetition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approachEquilibrium vengeanceThe persistence of social strategies under increasing competitive pressureMarket design with endogenous preferencesLabelling, homophily and preference evolutionComparative statics of altruism and spiteComparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complementsThe effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of \(2\times \)2 gamesEquilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferencesCommitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric informationHow does socio-economic environment influence the distribution of altruism?Preference evolution and reciprocityThe economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferencesAgents with imperfect empathy may survive natural selectionDecision making under uncertainty and the evolution of interdependent preferencesEvolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflictEvolution and Kantian moralityEvolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching EnvironmentsEvolutionary stability of discrimination under observabilityOn competition and welfare enhancing policies in a mixed oligopolyEvolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative gamesThe strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative gamesRegular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games




Cites Work




This page was built for publication: The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.