Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
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Publication:306750
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.001zbMath1368.91031OpenAlexW2101295008MaRDI QIDQ306750
Publication date: 1 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.001
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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