Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.06.001zbMATH Open1368.91031OpenAlexW2101295008MaRDI QIDQ306750FDOQ306750

Authors: Florian Morath, Kai A. Konrad 

Publication date: 1 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.001

Recommendations

• Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
• ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationevolutionary stabilityfinite populationtake-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
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• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
• Tax competition, relative performance, and policy imitation
• A Theory of the Firm with Non-binding Employment Contracts
• Homo moralis -- preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

Cited In (6)

• A profit surplus distribution mechanism for supply chain coordination: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
• ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
• Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information.
• On the finite population evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium for perfect information extensive form games
• EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

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