The evolutionary stability of auctions over bargaining

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0067zbMATH Open0859.90062OpenAlexW2004067989MaRDI QIDQ1815582FDOQ1815582

Authors: Xiaohua Lu, R. Preston McAfee 

Publication date: 18 November 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/6f821e511fff3890f531497d1f615445ff740205

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingauctionsequilibrium in transaction mechanismshomogeneous buyers and sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (9)

• Dual mechanism for an online retailer
• Physical search
• Scale returns of a random matching model
• Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
• Equivalence of auctions and posted prices
• Evolutionary stability of auction and supply chain contracting: an analysis based on disintermediation in the Indian tea supply chains
• Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game
• Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
• Adverse selection in dynamic matching markets

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