The evolutionary stability of auctions over bargaining

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0067MaRDI QIDQ1815582zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiaohua Lu, R. Preston McAfee

Publication date 18 November 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/6f821e511fff3890f531497d1f615445ff740205

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingauctionsequilibrium in transaction mechanismshomogeneous buyers and sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Equivalence of auctions and posted prices
• Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
• Evolutionary stability of auction and supply chain contracting: an analysis based on disintermediation in the Indian tea supply chains
• Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior

Cited in

(9)

• Dual mechanism for an online retailer
• Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game
• Adverse selection in dynamic matching markets
• Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
• Scale returns of a random matching model
• Physical search
• Evolutionary stability of auction and supply chain contracting: an analysis based on disintermediation in the Indian tea supply chains
• Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
• Equivalence of auctions and posted prices

This page was built for publication: The evolutionary stability of auctions over bargaining

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1815582)