Equilibrium vengeance

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.10.006zbMATH Open1165.91320OpenAlexW4250502334MaRDI QIDQ2389306FDOQ2389306

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 15 July 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.006

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zbMATH Keywords

reciprocitysocial dilemmasevolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibriumvengeance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The logic of animal conflict
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
• A theory of reciprocity
• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• What to maximize if you must
• Evolution of Preferences1
• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario
• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• Introducing to the evolution of preferences
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Equilibrium vengeance
• Conspicuous consumption dynamics
• Statistical genetics and evolution
• COMPETITION OR CO‐OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games

Cited In (7)

• Cursed Equilibrium
• Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples
• Equilibrium vengeance
• How moral codes evolve in a trust game
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
• Is social responsibility for firms competing on quantity evolutionary stable?
• On the evolution of continuous types under replicator and gradient dynamics: two examples

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