Equilibrium vengeance
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Publication:2389306
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.10.006zbMath1165.91320OpenAlexW4250502334MaRDI QIDQ2389306
Publication date: 15 July 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.006
Related Items (6)
Equilibrium vengeance ⋮ How moral codes evolve in a trust game ⋮ Is social responsibility for firms competing on quantity evolutionary stable? ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli ⋮ On the evolution of continuous types under replicator and gradient dynamics: two examples ⋮ Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples
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