The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance

DOI10.1007/S11238-021-09800-9zbMath1460.91082OpenAlexW3135326836MaRDI QIDQ829503

Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date: 6 May 2021

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.902.3632

zbMATH Keywords

minimaxsupermodularityambiguityaggregative gamesevolution of preferencesChoquet expected utilityKnightian uncertaintyHurwicz criterionmonotone comparative staticsneo-additive capacityplaying the field

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Individual preferences (91B08) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

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