Non-additive beliefs in solvable games

DOI10.1023/A:1026549117322zbMath0977.91002MaRDI QIDQ5933900

Hans H. Haller

Publication date: 27 January 2002

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumnon-additive probabilitiessolvability of strategic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (8)

The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance ⋮ Nash was a first to axiomatize expected utility ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Granny versus game theorist: Ambiguity in experimental games ⋮ Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals ⋮ OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES ⋮ Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions ⋮ Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence

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