Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007zbMath1129.91004OpenAlexW2026401862MaRDI QIDQ817267

Ori Haimanko, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Pradeep Dubey

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium Cournot oligopoly pseudo-potential games strategic complements and substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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