POTENTIAL GAMES WITH AGGREGATION IN NON-COOPERATIVE GENERAL INSURANCE MARKETS
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4563794
DOI10.1017/asb.2016.31zbMath1390.91216OpenAlexW3123853258MaRDI QIDQ4563794
Athanasios A. Pantelous, Renchao Wu
Publication date: 4 June 2018
Published in: ASTIN Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/asb.2016.31
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (5)
On a Markovian game model for competitive insurance pricing ⋮ Pricing in a competitive stochastic insurance market ⋮ Nash equilibrium premium strategies for push-pull competition in a frictional non-life insurance market ⋮ Noncooperative dynamic games for general insurance markets ⋮ A dynamic pricing game for general insurance market
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Nash equilibria of over-the-counter bargaining for insurance risk redistributions: the role of a regulator
- Pricing general insurance in a reactive and competitive market
- Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- Optimal strategies for pricing general insurance
- Pricing general insurance with constraints
- Underwriting strategy in a competitive insurance environment
- Expenses and underwriting strategy in competition
- On the tradeoff between the law of large numbers and oligopoly in insurance
- Insurance market games: Scale effects and public policy
- Optimal premium pricing strategies for competitive general insurance markets
- Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
- Potential games
- Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
- Best-response potential games
- Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
- Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: a game-theoretic approach
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- Competition-Originated Cycles and Insurance Strategies
- Dynamic Pricing of General Insurance in a Competitive Market
- Risk Exchange with Distorted Probabilities
- COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH DISTORTION RISK MEASURES
- A Simple Model of Insurance Market Dynamics
- Optimal Management of an Insurer’s Exposure in a Competitive General Insurance Market
- Equilibrium Pricing of General Insurance Policies
- Pricing General Insurance Using Optimal Control Theory
This page was built for publication: POTENTIAL GAMES WITH AGGREGATION IN NON-COOPERATIVE GENERAL INSURANCE MARKETS
