Noncooperative dynamic games for general insurance markets
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Publication:1697229
DOI10.1016/j.insmatheco.2017.12.001zbMath1398.91315OpenAlexW2773355786MaRDI QIDQ1697229
Tim J. Boonen, Renchao Wu, Athanasios A. Pantelous
Publication date: 15 February 2018
Published in: Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2017.12.001
open-loop Nash equilibriumsolvency ratiofinite-time differential gameinsurance market competitionpremium cycles
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Related Items (5)
On a Markovian game model for competitive insurance pricing ⋮ Pricing in a competitive stochastic insurance market ⋮ Nash equilibrium premium strategies for push-pull competition in a frictional non-life insurance market ⋮ A dynamic pricing game for general insurance market ⋮ Loan interest rate Nash models with solvency constraints in the banking sector
Uses Software
Cites Work
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