Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0300-1zbMath1153.91014OpenAlexW2157765546MaRDI QIDQ957859

Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

Publication date: 1 December 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0300-1

zbMATH Keywords

potentialsex-post implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions ⋮ On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation ⋮ Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach ⋮ Ordinal potentials in smooth games ⋮ Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers ⋮ Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts ⋮ Locally robust implementation and its limits ⋮ Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

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• Incentives in Teams
• Efficient Auctions
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• Robust Mechanism Design
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• An Efficient Auction
• Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation

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