On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
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Publication:308609
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.010zbMath1371.91132OpenAlexW3121838600MaRDI QIDQ308609
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.010
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Stability with one-sided incomplete information, Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
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