On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.010zbMath1371.91132OpenAlexW3121838600MaRDI QIDQ308609

Benny Moldovanu, Deniz Dizdar

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.010

zbMATH Keywords

matchinginterdependent valuesmulti-dimensional attributespremuneration valuessurplus division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Stability with one-sided incomplete information, Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types
• Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: Equivalence, topology, and uniqueness
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• The nonatomic assignment model
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
• Matching through position auctions
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Optimal Transport
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage