On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.04.010zbMATH Open1371.91132OpenAlexW3121838600MaRDI QIDQ308609FDOQ308609

Authors Deniz Dizdar, Benny Moldovanu

Publication date 6 September 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.010

zbMATH Keywords

matchinginterdependent valuesmulti-dimensional attributespremuneration valuessurplus division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(4)

• Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information

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