On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.04.010zbMATH Open1371.91132OpenAlexW3121838600MaRDI QIDQ308609FDOQ308609

Benny Moldovanu, Deniz Dizdar

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.010

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zbMATH Keywords

matchinginterdependent valuesmulti-dimensional attributespremuneration valuessurplus division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Optimal Transport
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: Equivalence, topology, and uniqueness
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The nonatomic assignment model
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Robust Mechanism Design
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• Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
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• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

Cited In (3)

• The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information

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